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I. INTRODUCTION
In Cruz-Guzman v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
separation of powers principles did not prevent the judiciary from ruling on
whether the Minnesota Legislature violated its constitutionally mandated
duty to ensure an equal education. 1 The court reversed the Minnesota Court
of Appeals’ decision, which held that the question of the legislature’s
compliance regarding education was a political question. 2
As Cruz-Guzman decided, courts have and must continue to have
a role in education and maintain the right to education. In order to
demonstrate the importance of the court’s involvement in education
segregation, this note begins by discussing the role of education and recalling
the history of segregated education and its impact in the United States. 3 The
note then turns to an overview of federal cases that involved education 4 and
several state cases that continue to have an impact on education litigation. 5
A discussion of education clause cases in Minnesota follows. 6 Next, the note
discusses justiciability, the political question doctrine, and the judiciary’s
jurisdiction and its relation to education clause litigation. 7
The Cruz-Guzman decision and dissent are discussed afterwards. 8
After providing examples of various state courts that have decided education
clause cases 9 and state courts that held the issue to be nonjusticiable, 10 this
note argues that Minnesota, because of Cruz-Guzman, is a middle ground
between the two extremes of state-court approaches as it recognizes the
judiciary’s role while preserving the separation of powers. 11 State courts
should look to Minnesota’s approach when deciding justiciability and
jurisdictional issues in education cases because Cruz-Guzman gives the
appropriate deference to the legislature while ensuring the court maintains
its role to hear constitutional challenges to the legislative action.

J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law ’21; B.A. Biology and Spanish, The
College of St. Scholastica. I would like to thank Professor Jim Hilbert for his help and
guidance throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the Mitchell Hamline
Law Review members for their help with this article. Finally, I wish to thank my family and
friends for their support in all my endeavors.
Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2018).
Id. at 15.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.D.
See infra Section II.E.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.D.
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Finally, this note discusses why courts should enter the field of
education segregation cases. 12 While few courts have found education clause
cases to be nonjusticiable, there are benefits to courts extending jurisdiction
and rejecting the political question doctrine in order to hear claims
regarding segregation in schools. 13 The Minnesota Supreme Court, by giving
segregation claims their due regard in Cruz-Guzman, set an example for
courts in other states.
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW AND SOCIAL IMPACT

A. Education and Segregation Within the United States
Education is essential in maintaining our democracy. The Supreme
Court of the United States has noted that our democracy “depends on an
informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his
reading skills and thought processes have been adequately developed.” 14
Education, although not a right granted by the Constitution, 15 “provides the
basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to
benefit us all” and education “has a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society.” 16
Despite the “fundamental role” education plays in our society,
segregation continues to hinder education’s availability to Midwestern—and
particularly Minnesotan—students. 17 The Midwest has the highest
percentage of white students in the country. 18 Here, roughly two out of three
students are white. 19 In the 2016 to 2017 academic year, Minnesota’s total
enrollment was 842,948 students; approximately 67.8% of whom were
white, and all other racial groups represented less than 11% individually. 20

12
13

See infra Section IV.F.
Id.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
Id. at 35; see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (stating that
the Court has never “accepted the proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right.’”).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).

14
15

16
17

Id.

JENNIFER B. AYSCUE ET AL., HARMING OUR COMMON FUTURE: AMERICA’S SEGREGATED
SCHOOL
65
YEARS
AFTER
BROWN
17
(2006),
https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/harming-our-common-future-americas-segregated-schools-65-years-afterbrown/Brown-65-050919v4-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JDQ-ADED].
18

Id.
Id. at 19 tbl.3. Black students represented 10.5% of the student population. Id. Latino
students represented 8.9%. Id. Asian students represented 6.8%. Id. American Indian
students represented 1.6%. Id. Multiracial students represented 4.4% of students. Id.

19
20
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Large metro areas, 21 like the Twin Cities, 22 have a racial distribution of
students between suburban areas and central city areas. In suburban areas,
46.9% of the student population is white. 23 In central city areas, only 20.3%
of the student population is white. 24 Black, Latino, Asian, American Indian,
and Multiracial students account for roughly 80% of the student population
in central city areas. 25 In the suburbs, these racial groups account for
approximately 53% of the student population. 26
There are a couple of ways to measure segregation: (1) the
concentration of non-white students in schools; and (2) the exposure that a
typical student of each race has to students of other races. 27 The number of
schools that enroll 90–100% of non-white students tripled to 18.2% in
2016. 28 Additionally, the average white student “attended a school with more
than two-thirds white peers while the typical black student and the typical
Latino student attend[ed] schools with about one-fourth white peers.” 29
These two measurements demonstrate that segregation is still present in the
United States education system. 30
The impact of segregation continues to be studied today. Research
has shown that disadvantaged students in predominately black and Latino
high schools are less likely to earn a high school diploma or its equivalent
by the age of twenty-six compared to disadvantaged students in
predominately white high schools. 31 Students from predominately white
high schools are also more likely to continue their education or earn a
bachelor’s degree by the age of twenty-six compared to students in
predominately black and Latino high schools. 32 Other studies have found
similar results. One study suggested that when black children from ages two
to seventeen are continuously exposed to the least disadvantaged

Id. at 20 tbl.4 (defining a “Large Metro” as an area with a population of 250,000 or more).
Frederick Melo, St. Paul and Minneapolis Are Growing. Here’s How They Compare to
Other Metro Cities., TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (May 20, 2019),
21
22

https://www.twincities.com/2019/05/20/st-paul-and-minneapolis-lead-population-growthacross-the-twin-cities/ [https://perma.cc/3L9X-H6LK].
AYSCUE, supra note 18, at 20 tbl.4.
23

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 21. In 1988, the percentage of schools that enrolled 90–100% non-white students was
5.7%. Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 12–13.
Pat Rubio Goldsmith, Schools or Neighborhoods or Both? Race and Ethnic Segregation
and Educational Attainment, 87 SOCIAL FORCES 1913, 1935 (2009).
Id.

24
25
26
27
28

29
30
31

32
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neighborhoods, 33 96% of those students would graduate high school before
turning twenty. 34 In comparison, if the same group of students were
continuously exposed to the most disadvantaged neighborhoods during
those same years, only 76% of the students would graduate. 35
Following court-ordered school desegregation, studies have shown
that there are various long-term impacts of desegregation. For example,
desegregation exposure “produces an immediate jump in the likelihood of
graduating” high school. 36 Furthermore, every additional year of
desegregation increases the likelihood of high school graduation. 37 Courtordered desegregation has effects beyond schooling. For example, exposure
to desegregated education was associated with an increase in wages, more
work hours, and occupational prestige. 38 The consequent increase in
occupational attainment has positively impacted families’ economic status. 39

B. Federal Cases Involving Education and Segregation
Though the Supreme Court started framing education equality as a
constitutional right in prior cases, 40 it did not fully address the issue until a
landmark decision in 1954. 41 Brown v. Board of Education held that
“separate but equal” was no longer enough, and racially segregated schools
were unequal and violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 42 Although it was a revolutionary holding on education, Brown
stopped short of stating that education was a fundamental constitutional
A “disadvantaged” neighborhood is analyzed under seven characteristics: poverty,
unemployment, welfare receipt, female-headed households, high school education, college
education and occupational structure. Geoffrey T. Wodtke et al., Neighborhood Effects in
33

Temporal Perspective: The Impact of Long-Term Exposure to Concentrated Disadvantage
on High School Graduation, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 713, 720 (2011).
Id. at 729.
Id.
Rucker C. Johnson, Long-run Impacts of School Desegregation & School Quality on Adult
Attainments 18–19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1666, 2011),

34
35
36

https://www.nber.org/papers/w16664.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB78-QRYR].
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21.
See Lia Epperson, Civil Rights Remedies in Higher Education: Jurisprudential Limitations
and Lost Moments in Time, 23 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 343, 345 n.4 (2017)
(listing Supreme Court cases that started to articulate a constitutional right to racial equality
in education). Two of the cases noted are Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950),
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
Sweatt required Texas to admit African American students to law school, while McLaurin
found that state-imposed restriction requiring an African American student to sit in
segregated locations deprived the student of his right to equal protection under the law.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 495.
37
38
39
40

41
42
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right. 43 When the Supreme Court revisited the case a year later, Brown was
further limited in that it gave “no clear instructions about how to achieve
desegregated schools” or even what desegregation meant. 44 The judicial
desegregation effort transpired through various cases and took time. 45
In 1971, the California Supreme Court decided Serrano v. Priest I,
a landmark case that addressed constitutional violations in the context of
public schooling. 46 The court found that local property taxes, which funded
the schools, varied among districts and resulted in differing levels of
education opportunities. 47 The disparities this funding system created
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the
California Constitution’s Equal Guaranty provision. 48 The case was revisited
two years later in Serrano v. Priest II, when the court was asked to review
the legislation adopted after the first decision. 49
The United States Supreme Court entered the education funding
realm in 1973 with San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 50
The claims and allegations in Rodriguez were relatively similar to those in
Serrano I. 51 The plaintiffs in Rodriguez were challenging, on equal

43

Id.

Susan E. Eaton & Gary A. Orfield, Brown v. Board of Education and the Continuing
Struggle for Desegregated Schools, in 13 READINGS ON EQUAL EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS

44

AFTER THE BROWN DECISION: IMPLICATIONS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 117, 121 (Kofi
Lomotey & Charles Teddlie eds., 1996).
In 1968, the Court stated that racial identification was complete and extended to all areas
of the school. Green v. City Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). The
Court listed the student body, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and
facilities as ways to analyze whether desegregation had been achieved. Id.; see also Eaton &
Orfield, supra note 44, at 121–22. A year later, the Court required that schools desegregate
immediately. It noted that “continued operation of segregated schools under standard of
allowing ‘all deliberate speed’ for desegregation is no longer constitutionally permissible.”
Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bds. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969); see also Eaton & Orfield,
supra note 44, at 122.
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
Id. at 1244.
45

46
47
48

Id.

Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 932 (1977) (holding that the California public school
financing system violated the equal protection provisions of the California constitution).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Serrano I was a class action lawsuit brought by students and parents against county and state
officials in charge of financing the California public school systems. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at
1241. The plaintiffs alleged that the school financing scheme was unconstitutional. The
school system was mainly based on local property taxes, which caused disparities. Id. at 1244.
As a result of the property taxes, plaintiffs alleged that they paid more than others for their
children to have the same or lesser education. Id. at 1244–45. In Rodriguez, the publicschool system relied on local property taxes to supplement a state-funded program for
education. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 9–10. Plaintiffs alleged that the current system of financing
public education, based on local property taxes, favored families in more affluent areas. Id.
49

50
51
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protection grounds, the constitutionality of a funding system that created
disparities among financially different school districts. 52 The claims were
similar to those in Serrano, but the outcome was very different. Though the
Rodriquez Court agreed that Texas’s school-finance system was inequitable,
it denied the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims. 53 The Court held that
education was not a fundamental right, 54 and financial differences were not
the cause of the disparities. 55 This decision eliminated the availability of
federal courts in education adequacy suits and federal equal protection
challenges, essentially limiting future plaintiffs to state courts for a remedy. 56
One of the rationales provided by the Court in Rodriguez was that
issues related to education funding were more appropriate for the legislature
than the courts. 57 Many courts have relied on this rationale to dismiss
education adequacy claims as political questions. 58 Indeed, this was the
dissent’s position in Cruz-Guzman. 59 Following Rodriguez, various state
courts chose the path of non-intervention, which lasted through 1976. 60
After Rodriguez, plaintiffs were forced to turn to their state
constitutions as the basis of education litigation. 61 Plaintiffs had various
degrees of success relying on their states’ constitutional guarantees regarding
at 1. Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that the inter-district disparities in school financing for
each student violated equal protection. Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 50–51. The Court stated that “it is no doubt true that reliance on local property
taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures
for some districts than for others, the existence of ‘some inequality’ . . . is not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.” Id.
Id. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).
Id. at 28.
See Avidan Y. Cover, Is Adequacy a More Political Question Than Equality: The Effect
of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11 CORNELL
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 403, 404 (2002) (describing the effect of San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez in education finance litigation). Following the decision in Rodriguez,
states began to hold that education was a fundamental right under their constitutions.
Through Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 949–52 (Cal. 1976), California became the first
state to declare education a right under its constitution. See Timothy D. Lynch, Education
as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 953, 970–72 (1988) (discussing the Serrano case and its implications).
Annette B. Johnson, State Court Intervention in School Finance Reform, 28 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 325, 333 (1979). According to the Rodriguez Court, “consideration and initiation of
fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for
the legislative processes of the various [s]tates.” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58.
See infra Section IV.C.
See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Minn. 2018) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Johnson, supra note 57, at 335–36.
In Rodriguez, Justice Marshall stated, “nothing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit
further review of state educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.”
411 U.S. at 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52
53

54

55
56

57

58
59
60
61
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education. 62 The varied and often low levels of success led plaintiffs to turn
to new theories since those based on funding inequities were not producing
meaningful changes. 63
The history of state-level education adequacy cases is relatively new.
Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 64 decided in 1989, is a landmark
case. 65 In Rose, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that a child has a
fundamental “right to an adequate education” under the Kentucky
Constitution. 66 The court went further, holding that the “entire system of
common schools [was] unconstitutional.” 67
In the same year, two other states decided cases with adequacy
elements. 68 In Texas, the court held that the “state’s school financing system
is neither financially efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a
‘general diffusion of knowledge’ statewide.” 69 In Montana, there is a
constitutional guarantee of equal education that is not limited to one branch
of the government. 70 As such, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that
the “failure to adequately fund” education programs resulted in a failure of
providing “a system of quality public education granting to each student the
equality of educational opportunity” that the state’s constitution guarantees. 71
These cases focused on ensuring that each student had enough resources to
have an adequate education. 72
Will Stancil & Jim Hilbert, Justiciability of State Law School Segregation Claims, 44
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 399, 418 (2018).
Id. at 418; see also Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation and Adequacy
Studies, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 75 (2004).
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
McDonald, supra note 63, at 76.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
The court was very clear in their holding, stating:
Lest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is that Kentucky’s entire
system of common schools is unconstitutional. There is no allegation that only
part of the common school system is invalid, and we find no such circumstance.
This decision applies to the entire sweep of the system—all its parts and parcels.
This decision applies to the statutes creating, implementing and financing the
system and to all regulations, etc., pertaining thereto. This decision covers the
creation of local school districts, school boards, and the Kentucky Department
of Education to the Minimum Foundation Program and Power Equalization
Program. It covers school construction and maintenance, teacher certification—
the whole gamut of the common school system in Kentucky.
Id. at 215.
62

63

64
65
66
67

See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Helena Elem. Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 297.
Helena, 769 P.2d at 689.
Id. at 690.
Stancil & Hilbert, supra note 62, at 420.

68

69
70
71
72
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Most adequacy cases only addressed the financing of public
education. Few addressed the much larger issue of segregation in education
until a landmark Connecticut case shifted education claims away from
simple funding theories. 73 In Sheff v. O’Neill, 74 students from the Hartford
metropolitan area brought a claim against the state, alleging that the high
levels of racial isolation 75 violated the state constitution. 76 The court decided
that the Connecticut Legislature had a constitutional obligation to “remedy
segregation in [Connecticut’s] public schools.” 77 The plaintiffs argued that
racial segregation violated Connecticut’s constitution, regardless of whether
the segregation was intentional or not, 78 and the Connecticut Supreme Court
agreed. 79
One of the most notable aspects of Sheff is that the court in Sheff
departed from the dominating federal common law to “carve out a new
precedent” for state law. 80 The court eliminated the state action doctrine as
a defense and held that even if the “legislature did not affirmatively create
or intend to create” the isolation, that did not relieve the defendants of their
obligation when “constitutional grievances” were at issue. 81 The court relied
on Connecticut’s Constitution to arrive at this conclusion. 82 The court
eventually held that Connecticut had an affirmative duty to remedy the racial
segregation that existed in public schools. 83 The Supreme Court of
Connecticut stated that the affirmative duty to provide a substantially equal
See John C. Brittain, Why Sheff v. O’Neill is a Landmark Decision, 30 CONN. L. REV.
211, 211 (1997).
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
At the time of trial, ninety-two percent of the student population in Hartford was African
American or Latino. Richard Fossey, The Hartford Desegregation Case: Is There a Judicial
Remedy for Racially Isolated Inner-City School Districts?, in 13 READINGS ON EQUAL
EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS AFTER THE BROWN DECISION: IMPLICATIONS OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 157, 159 (Kofi Lomotey & Charles Teddlie eds., 1996). The surrounding
suburban school districts were overwhelmingly white. Id.
Id. at 160–61.
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1283.
Sheff v. O’Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 WL 230992, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 12,
1995), rev’d, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1283. At the trial court level, however, the presiding judge disagreed
with the plaintiffs’ arguments that even if the segregation was not caused by the state, the
constitution required action on the part of the state. Sheff, 1995 WL 230992, at *29. Judge
Hammer stated that the racial isolation was beyond the control of the state and “racially
balanced municipalities are beyond the pale of either judicial or legislative intervention.” Id.
at *28 (citations omitted).
Brittain, supra note 73, at 212.
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1279–80.
Id. at 1280. The plaintiffs asserted their claims under a combination of constitutional
provisions: the right to education, an equal protection right, and a prohibition against
segregation and discrimination on account of race. Id.
Id. at 1283.
73

74
75

76
77
78

79

80
81
82

83
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education for all school children in the state’s constitution made the state
action doctrine inoperative as a defense. 84 By doing so, the court laid the
groundwork for cases that advocate for desegregation through state
constitutional law. 85 Cruz-Guzman rests firmly on this groundwork. 86

C. State Constitutional Provisions on Education
Each state decides what it will and will not include in its constitution.
Because the U.S. Constitution does not have a provision setting a minimum
level of education, states are entitled to establish their systems of education
on their own terms. In every single state constitution, there is a mandate to
provide a system of free public schools. 87 Generally, state constitutions’
education provisions can be grouped into four categories: (1) “establishment
provisions;” (2) “quality provisions;” (3) “strong mandate” provisions; and
(4) “high duty provisions.” 88
“Establishment provisions” are the lowest level of imposed duty on
the state and merely require that a school system be established. 89 Twentyone states only have this minimum level of duty. 90 “Quality provisions” are
the next level of duty imposed on the state and require a system of education
“of a specific quality.” 91 Eighteen states require this type of education
system. 92 Next, there are “strong mandate” provisions that require education
of a certain quality and “provide a strong mandate to achieve it.” 93 Five state
constitutions place this highest level of duty on the government. 94 The

84

Id. at 1280.

Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection and Metropolitan Integration: The Hope of the
Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 L. & INEQ. 269, 274 (2006).
See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2018) (citing Sheff, 678 A.2d at

85

86

1292).
William E. Thro, Judicial Humility: The Enduring Legacy of Rose v. Council for Better
Education, 98 KY. L.J. 717, 725 (2010).
Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 726.
Id. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont. Id.
at n.51.
Id. at 726.
Id. These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at n.52.
Id. at 726. These states are California, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada, Rhode Island, and South
Dakota. Id. at n.53.
Id. at 726 n.54. These states include Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, and Washington.
87

88
89
90

91
92

93

94

Id.
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constitutional provision in these five states “seem to place education above
other governmental functions such as highways or welfare.” 95

D. Minnesota Cases on Education and Segregation
The Minnesota Constitution mandates a uniform system of public
schools. 96 Specifically, it states,
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly
upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature
to establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The
legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as
will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools
throughout the state. 97
Minnesota’s constitutional mandate has been described as a
provision that requires an education system of a specific quality. 98 The
Minnesota judiciary has a long history of adjudicating cases concerning
education. 99

1. Skeen v. State
Skeen v. State is a notable case in Minnesota’s judicial history and
a part of the court’s reasoning in Cruz-Guzman. Skeen is based on two
100

101

claims related to Minnesota’s education funding system. 102 The first claim
alleged that Minnesota’s education system failed to satisfy the constitutional
duty of uniformity placed on the legislature. 103 The second claim alleged that
the funding system in place violated the equal protection guarantee of the
Minnesota Constitution because it caused disparities in educational
opportunity related to property wealth, “thereby leading to a lifetime of
relative disadvantage.” 104 Within this second claim, the plaintiffs asserted that
95
96
97

Id. at 726.

MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.

Id.

Thro, supra note 87, at 726 n.52.
The first case addressing the education clause of the Minnesota Constitution was Board of
Education v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412 (Minn. 1871).
505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
In Skeen, fifty-two school districts and ten parents sued the State of Minnesota, the State
Board of Education, and the Commissioner of Education. Id. at 301. The plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, stating that certain components of the education finance
system were unconstitutional under the education clause. Id.
Id. at 308, 312.
Id. at 308. Plaintiffs claimed that under the education finance system in place at the time,
local authorities had broad discretion over each district’s finances. Id. As a result, wealthier
school districts had greater ability to raise additional revenue than lower-income districts,
causing a lack of uniformity among school districts across the state. Id.
Id. at 303.
98
99

100
101

102
103

104
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the constitution created a fundamental right to education, which was
impinged upon by funding system. 105
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the legislature had a duty
to establish a “basic system” to ensure the overall system was sufficient to
meet the state constitutional requirement of a “uniform[,] . . . thorough[,]
and efficient system of public schools.” 106 Although the Skeen court
concluded that there was no fundamental right to “the financing of the
education system,” it recognized a fundamental right to a uniform system of
education. 107 By holding so in Skeen, Minnesota joined other states in
recognizing that education is a fundamental right. 108 In the process of
resolving the equal protection claim, the court began to develop what a
fundamental right to education may look like. The court stated that there is
a fundamental right “to a ‘general and uniform system of education’ which
provides an adequate education to all students in Minnesota.” 109 Thus, the
Minnesota Constitution requires a system that meets three criteria: general,
uniform, and adequate.

2. Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. State
Prior to Cruz-Guzman, schools districts in Minneapolis had faced
a segregation case when members of the community filed Minneapolis
Branch of the NAACP v. State of Minnesota. 110 Six years after the decision
in Sheff, the NAACP filed a similar suit that utilized Sheff as the basis for
desegregating Minneapolis schools. 111 The complaint alleged that Minnesota
had not taken sufficiently effective action to desegregate schools in
Minneapolis. 112 The plaintiffs accused the state of enabling racial segregation
within the Twin Cities area by allowing open enrollment and racially

105
106
107
108

Id. at 312.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 314–15.
The Skeen court cited cases in Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 313–14.

The Supreme Court of Washington held that the constitutional statute “placed a paramount
duty on the state to provide ample education.” Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King County v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that “‘equal
opportunity to education’ is a fundamental right.” Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579
(Wis. 1989). Wyoming’s constitutional requirement for “thorough and efficient” schools left
the courts with “no room for any conclusion but that education . . . is a . . . fundamental
interest.” Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980).
Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1).
Complaint, Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. Minnesota, No. 95–14800 (Hennepin
Cty. Dist. Ct. Sep. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Minneapolis NAACP Complaint].
Orfield, supra note 85, at 274.
Minneapolis NAACP Complaint, supra note 110, at 15.
109
110

111
112
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segregated charter schools. 113 In 2000, the case ended with a settlement that
created a desegregation effort. 114
The effort created the Choice Is Yours program, which opened
space for 2,000 low-income students to attend suburban schools. 115 The
program provided two options for families to access suburban schools and
select schools within the Minneapolis school district. 116 The first choice was
through an inter-district transfer mechanism, where eligible students 117
would receive priority placement in suburban school districts. 118 The other
choice was within the Minneapolis school district and allowed students to
attend specific schools within the district. 119 For the 2000 to 2001 school
year, roughly sixty-eight percent or 31,000 students were eligible for the
Choice Is Yours program. 120 However, the impact of the program is difficult
to examine. 121 In terms of academic outcomes, “there was not a clear
effect.” 122 However, ninety-six of the participants indicated they would
recommend the program to others. 123
The term of the settlement expired in 2005, but some state and
federal funding allowed the program to be extended for a few years. 124 The
program no longer exists today, and Minnesota has chosen to “pursue
policies and practices that have resulted in ongoing large scale segregation
of metro area schools.” 125 The alleged policies and practices in the Twin

113

Id. at 16.

Settlement Agreement at 1, Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. Minnesota, No. 95–
14800 (Hennepin Cty. Dist. Ct. 2000).
Orfield, supra note 85, at 274.
See id. at 314.
To qualify for the Choice Is Yours program, a student must have been a Minneapolis
resident who qualified for free or reduced lunch. Id. at 315 (citing ELISABETH A. PALMER,
THE CHOICE IS YOURS AFTER TWO YEARS: AN EVALUATION i–ii (2003)). The Choice Is
Yours program gave these students priority placement in the already-existing open
enrollment program. Id.
Id. (citing ELISABETH A. PALMER, THE CHOICE IS YOURS AFTER TWO YEARS: AN
EVALUATION 1–9 (2003)).
Id. at 314. The same student qualifications applied to both aspects of the program. Id.
ELISABETH A. PALMER, THE CHOICE IS YOURS AFTER TWO YEARS: AN EVALUATION 13
(2003).
Erin Hinrichs, As Desegregation Case Proceeds, Here’s a Look at What Became of the
Metro’s
Earlier
Effort,
MINNPOST
(Aug.
21,
2018),
https://www.minnpost.com/education/2018/08/desegregation-case-proceeds-here-s-lookwhat-became-metros-earlier-effort/ [https://perma.cc/53SP-R4XC].
114

115
116
117

118

119
120

121

122
123
124
125

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2020]

CASE NOTE: CRUZ-GUZMAN V. STATE

899

Cities Metro Area of Minnesota led to Cruz-Guzman, a class action lawsuit
filed in November 2015. 126

E. Justiciability, the Political Question Doctrine, and Why State Courts
Are Better for School Segregation Claims
The central issue in Cruz-Guzman was the justiciability of the
school segregation claim. 127 The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed the
case as a nonjusticiable political question. 128 The doctrine of justiciability
entered American jurisprudence through Marbury v. Madison, 129 and its
operational foundation lies in Baker v. Carr. 130 In Marbury, the Court
discussed its duty to determine constitutional issues and the limitations on
its power of judicial review. 131 Chief Justice Marshall stated that the role of
the Court is “to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the
executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a
discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.” 132 For a claim to be a nonjusticiable political question, it must involve:
[1.] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or
[2.] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or
[3.] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
[4.] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or
[5.] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or
[6.] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 133
Class Action Complaint at 1–4, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App.
2017) (No. 27-CV-15-19117) [hereinafter Cruz-Guzman Complaint].
Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Minn. 2018).
Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 535.
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170, stating:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not
to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.

126

127
128
129
130
131

132
133

Id.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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Within this framework, the Court has noted that “[u]nless one of
these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question’s
presence.” 134 Despite developing the doctrine, the Court has not used it
often 135
In Minnesota, a justiciable case exists if the “claim ‘(1) involves
definite and concrete assertions of right that emanate from a legal source;
(2) involves a genuine conflict in tangible interests between parties with
adverse interests; and (3) is capable of specific resolution by judgment rather
than presenting hypothetical facts that would form an advisory opinion.’” 136
For the court to exercise jurisdiction, a justiciable controversy must be
present. 137 Minnesota is not limited by the federal rules of justiciability and
is allowed to create its own justiciability doctrine because state courts have a
unique role of being a remedial court. 138 In addition to the rights that the
government may not infringe upon, state constitutions also grant positive
rights to their citizens. 139
As mentioned above, the federal government has had an impact on
how school segregation cases are tried. Over time, U.S. Supreme Court has
slowly reduced the power of the federal government in school segregation
cases and made it harder for plaintiffs to be successful. To prove a
constitutional violation in federal court, plaintiffs have to demonstrate that
they are receiving a segregated education and that the state is intentionally
discriminating among its students. 140 Evidence of such discriminatory intent
includes decisions regarding policies and action that are made with the
discriminatory effect as a goal. 141 The Supreme Court listed factors such as
school size, attendance zones, district boundaries, and faculty and staff
assignments that can aid the calculus of discriminatory intent. 142
When segregation has been shown, federal courts have “broad”
equitable powers to remedy segregation. 143 However, this “broad” remedial
power of federal courts has been reduced over the years. In Milliken v.
134

Id.

MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
THE STATE COURTS 140 nn.48–49 (The University of Chicago Press ed., 2009).
135

THROUGH

McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Onvoy,
Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617–18 (Minn. 2007).
Bricking v. City of Minneapolis, 891 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Minn. 2017).
Stancil & Hilbert, supra note 62, at 430–31.
Id. at 432.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
Id. at 213.
Id. The Court also noted other factors that can show a discriminatory intent: school site
location, school construction and renovation, transportation, and student assignment and
transfer options. Id.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
136

137
138
139
140
141
142

143
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Bradley, the Court essentially limited remedies to the boundaries of the

school district unless there were inter-district effects emanating from
segregation. 144 These inter-district remedies only work in smaller
communities or when a metro area has an expansive, single school district.
The Twin Cities is a large area with multiple school districts, and
federal remedies for segregation would be limited to specific districts even
if the issue is larger than one district. Plaintiffs are further burdened by the
decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, which required plaintiffs to show “a violation
that caused segregation between adjoining districts.” 145 Despite the extensive
evidential burdens imposed on plaintiffs in federal court, the remedies are
short-lived. 146
Due to the Supreme Court’s narrow construction of segregation
cases, plaintiffs have moved to state courts to vindicate their rights. The
plaintiffs in Cruz-Guzman did precisely that by choosing Minnesota’s state
courts, based on the state’s duty “to establish a general and uniform system
of public schools.” 147 One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Cruz-Guzman
plainly stated, “[W]e’re not in federal court, and that’s a very deliberate
decision. The federal courts have essentially made Brown an historical
artifact.” 148 State courts are not subject to the same remedial limitations that
Milliken placed on federal courts. 149 Additionally, the lack of extensive
jurisprudence tying state courts’ hands in education segregation matters
allows state courts more flexibility to grant equitable remedies.
The background on education cases and the history of justiciability
help shape this case note’s understanding of the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decision in Cruz-Guzman.

144

418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974), holding:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set
aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing
a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional
violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in
another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts
of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a
substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.

Id.

515 U.S. 70, 94 (1995).
The Supreme Court has stated that decrees concerning segregation efforts are “not
intended to operate in perpetuity.” School Bd. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
248 (1991).
See MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
Josh Verges, Lawsuit Accuses Metro Schools of Failing Minorities, TWIN CITIES PIONEER
PRESS (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.twincities.com/2015/11/04/lawsuit-accuses-metroschools-of-failing-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/72EJ-XBDC].
See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744–45.
145
146

147
148

149
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III. THE CRUZ-GUZMAN DECISION

A. Facts & Procedural History
Cruz-Guzman was filed as a class action lawsuit in November 2015
in the Hennepin County District Court against the State of Minnesota. 150
Seven families and one nonprofit organization challenged the alleged
segregation in Saint Paul and Minneapolis school districts. 151 Specifically, the
plaintiffs contended that the State failed to fulfill its constitutionally imposed
duty under the Education Clause 152 and the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses 153 of the Minnesota constitution. The complaint alleged that
although approximately 29% of students in Minnesota’s public school
system were children of color, a vast majority of those students were in
Minneapolis and Saint Paul school districts. 154 In Minneapolis,
approximately 66% of students are children of color, and in Saint Paul,
about 78% are children of color. 155
In contrast, the school districts surrounding Minneapolis and Saint
Paul had an overwhelming percentage of white students. 156 The complaint
attributed this segregation to several factors. One factor was the boundary
decisions made by Minneapolis and Saint Paul schools and the allowance
of open-enrollment policies. 157 The complaint also cited charter schools 158 as
a factor contributing to segregation. 159 Plaintiffs alleged that the state allowed
the formation of “numerous charter schools segregated by race and
socioeconomic status” within the Twin Cities. 160 Indeed, the state of
Minnesota has permitted intentional segregation in charter schools. 161
150
151

Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 4.
Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 126, ¶ 1. Other than a Minnesota nonprofit

corporation, the plaintiffs were guardians and next friends of children “enrolled, or expected
to be enrolled during the pendency of this action” in the Minneapolis Public Schools, Special
School District No. 1, and the Saint Paul Public Schools, Independent School District 625.

Id.
152
153
154
155
156
157

MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 7.
Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 126, ¶ 21.

Id.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶¶ 27–28.

Charter schools’ purpose is “to improve all pupil learning and all student achievement.”
MINN. STAT. § 124E.01, subdiv. 1 (2019). A charter school is a public school and “part of
the state’s system of public education,” yet it is “exempt from all statutes and rules applicable
to a school, school board, or school district unless . . . made specifically applicable to a
charter school.” MINN. STAT. § 124E.03, subdiv. 1 (2019).
Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 126, ¶¶ 27–28.
Id. ¶ 29.
Id. ¶ 30. Rule 3535 was adopted in 1999 with the purpose to reaffirm the importance of
public school integration, prevent segregation, encourage districts to allow students to attend
158

159
160
161
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Plaintiffs claimed that school districts drew and redrew school
attendance boundaries in a manner that led to school segregation because
areas of attendance were segregated on the basis of income. 162 Furthermore,
plaintiffs argued that Twin Cities schools have used funds marked for
desegregation and education of “socioeconomically deprived children[] for
other purposes.” 163 As a result of these practices, plaintiffs alleged, segregated
schools were denying students their right to an adequate education
guaranteed under the Minnesota Constitution. Plaintiffs cited segregation as
a reason for the substantially lower achievement of Minneapolis and Saint
Paul public-school children compared to children in other areas. 164
Plaintiffs asked the district court to permanently enjoin the
defendants from continuing the alleged discriminatory practices and order
the defendants to fix the practices and provide “adequate and desegregated
education.” 165 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the lower
court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and plaintiffs’ failure to join all necessary
parties. 166 The case survived the motion to dismiss at the district court level. 167
The district court stated that any violation of the Education Clause is subject
“to strict judicial scrutiny” and that the judiciary could hear the claim. 168 The
district court did, however, dismiss various defendants and claims brought
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 169
Defendants appealed the district court’s decision, arguing: (1) the
district court should have dismissed the case as nonjusticiable or as a matter
racially balanced schools, and provide a system that identifies racially isolated districts. MINN.
ADMIN. R. § 3535.0100(B), (F)–(H). The rule defines a school as “a site in a public school
district serving any of kindergarten through grade 12.” Id. § 3535.0110(8). However, it also
states that the definition of school does not include “charter schools under Minnesota
Statutes, chapter 124E.” Id. § 3535.0110(8)(A); see also Bojan Manojlovic, Betraying Brown:

Rule 3535, School RE-Segregation in the Twin Cities, and the Chance to Change Course,

35 L. & INEQ. 419, 428–30 (2017) (discussing Rule 3535’s adoption and efficacy).
In Cruz-Guzman, the district court refused to exempt charter schools from the
desegregation lawsuit. Order Denying Defendant-Intervenor’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (No. 27-CV15-19117). This could have a profound impact on the constitutionality of charter schools and
their requirements for integration. Josh Verges, Racial Integration Laws Exempting Charter
Schools Might Be Unconstitutional, MN Judge Rules, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (June
13, 2019), https://www.twincities.com/2019/06/13/racial-integration-laws-exempting-charterschools-might-be-unconstitutional-mn-judge-rules/ [https://perma.cc/R6LB-NUGM].
Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 126, ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ C.
Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018).
Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 6.
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id.
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better left to the legislature; (2) legislative immunity prevented plaintiffs’
claims against members of the Minnesota Senate and House of
Representatives; and (3) the complaint should have been dismissed for
failing to join individual school districts and charter schools. 170 Agreeing with
the defendants, the Minnesota Court of Appeals deemed the plaintiffs’
claims nonjusticiable political questions. 171 Since the court found the claims
to be political questions, it did not address the remaining issues brought
forth by the State. 172
The plaintiffs appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, and the
court granted review. 173 The court also granted the State’s petition for review
of the remaining issues that the court of appeals did not address. 174 On
review, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the dismissal order of the
Court of Appeals.

B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 4-2 ruling addressed the
justiciability of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the issue of legislative
immunity, and the possible failure to join required parties. 175

1. The Majority’s Decision Regarding the Education Clause
The Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed the justiciability of
the Education Clause claims. The majority—instead of shying away from its
judicial duty and declaring the claims political questions—stated that the
judiciary is the appropriate place for determining whether the Minnesota
Legislature’s has met its constitutional duty. 176 By doing so, Minnesota joined
a group of other states that recognize education as a fundamental right and
rightfully identifies violations of that right as justiciable issues to be
adjudicated by the courts. 177
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id. at 7.
Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 535.
Id. at 541.
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 7.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.

Other state supreme court cases that have found lawsuits involving the standard of
education to be justiciable include:
Arkansas, Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark.
2002); Colorado, Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358 (Colo. 2009); Connecticut,
Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206 (Conn.
2010); Idaho, Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913
(Idaho 1998); Kansas, Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014); Kentucky,
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Maryland,
177
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The court has “consistently adjudicated claims asserting violations
of the [Education] Clause,” and has stated the clause’s purpose is to “ensure
a regular method throughout the state, whereby all may be enabled to
acquire an education which will fit them to discharge intelligently their duties
as citizens of the republic.” 178 The court has also adjudicated a case where it
decided that the current education system “provided by the Legislature did
not violate the Education Clause.” 179 Most recently, the court adjudicated
Skeen, in which it stated there was no “constitutional violation” of the
Education Clause. 180 The court maintained that although the Education
Clause imposes a mandate to the Legislature, it does not “follow that the
judiciary cannot adjudicate whether the Legislature has satisfied its
constitutional duty.” 181
The court artfully stated that the requested relief was “to answer a
yes or no question.” 182 The question was whether the courts are the
“appropriate domain” to determine “whether the Legislature has violated
its constitutional duty under the Education Clause.” 183 By framing the
question this way, the court maintained its constitutional role of deciding
what has or hasn’t exceeding beyond the limits of the Constitution.
Additionally, this framing allowed the Legislature to continue its own
constitutional role of establishing a system of public schools without
unnecessary intrusion by the courts.
Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983);
Massachusetts, McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516
(Mass. 1993); Montana, Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State,
109 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005); New Hampshire, Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) (Claremont II); New Jersey, Abbott v.
Burke, 20 A.3d 1018 (N.J. 2011); New York, Hussein v. State, 19 N.Y.3d 899
(2012); North Carolina, Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Ohio,
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Tennessee, Tenn. Small Sch.
Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Texas, Neeley v. W.
Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005);
Vermont, Brigham v. State, 889 A.2d 715 (Vt. 2005); Washington, McCleary v.
State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012); West Virginia, Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859 (W.Va. 1979); Wisconsin, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wisc.
2000); and Wyoming, Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo.
1995).
Brief of Educ. Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8 n.2,
Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018) (No. A16-1265) [hereinafter
Educ. Law Ctr. Brief].
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 8 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412, 416 (Minn.
1871)).
Id. (citing Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1 (1878)).
Id. (citing Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn. 1993)).
Id. at 9.
178

179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id.
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Regarding the claims on the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, the court held that the issues were justiciable and were not political
questions. 184 Under Brown v. Board of Education, racial segregation claims
in education are “indisputably justiciable.” 185 The court based its reasoning
in part on Skeen v. State for the proposition that “education is a
fundamental right under the state constitution.” 186 The majority further
noted that citizens have a right to a “general and uniform system of
education.” 187 Based on the text of the Education Clause, the court
determined that the framers of the Minnesota Constitution would not have
wanted its citizens to receive just any type of education. 188 Rather, the framers
would have wanted citizens to have “an education which [would] fit them to
discharge intelligently their duties.” 189 The justices reasoned that it is their
constitutional duty to assess “whether constitutional requirements have been
met and whether appellants’ fundamental right to an adequate education
has been violated.” 190 Although some qualitative assessment may be
necessary to define what an adequate education is, “[t]his assessment is an
intrinsic part of [the court’s] power to interpret the meaning of the
constitution’s language.” 191
The court stated that the judiciary is the “appropriate domain” to
determine “whether the legislature has violated its constitutional duty under
the Education Clause.” 192 Basing its reasoning on Marbury v. Madison, 193 the
court stressed its judicial duty to state when the legislature “has clearly
transcended” the limitations imposed by the constitution. 194 According to the
court, it is a judicial question to interpret what a “general and uniform system
of public schools” 195 is, even if it is the job of the Legislature to establish that
system of schools. 196
The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously held that “education
is a fundamental right under the state constitution, not only because of its
overall importance to the state but also because of the explicit language used
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. at 12.
Id. at 10 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)).
Id. at 16 (quoting Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412, 416 (Minn. 1871)).
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 9.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is, emphatically, the province and duty
of the judicial department, to say what the law is.”).
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 10 (citing Rippe v. Becker, 56. Minn. 100, 57 N.W. 331,
336 (1894)).
Id. at 10 (quoting MINN. CONST. art XIII, §1).
Id. at 8.
193

194

195
196
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to describe this constitutional mandate.” 197 Minnesota’s constitution, unlike
the Constitution of the United States, imposes a duty upon the Minnesota
Legislature to establish “a general and uniform system of public schools.” 198
After the United States Supreme Court decided in Rodriguez that there was
no federal constitutional guarantee of education, there was no federal
subject matter jurisdiction for plaintiffs to receive their day in federal
courts. 199 Minnesota’s constitution, however, has granted subject matter
jurisdiction for education issues by declaring that education is a fundamental
right. 200 Justice Hudson, citing the importance of providing judicial remedies
for violated rights, firmly stated, “We will not shy away from our proper role
. . . merely because education is a complex area.” 201 It is the “judiciary’s
responsibility to determine what [the] constitution requires and whether the
Legislature has fulfilled its constitutional duty.” 202
The court then addressed whether the Minnesota House of
Representatives and Senate members were immune from the plaintiffs’
claims under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. 203
The court found that the clause did not immunize the members’
constitutional obligations under the Education Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, or the Due Process Clause, nor did it immunize them from cases
involving a failure to comply with their constitutional duties. 204
Finally, the court analyzed whether it lacked jurisdiction due to the
plaintiffs’ failure to join all necessary parties. The court, through
examinations of a statutory mechanism and a procedural rule, 205 found that
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993).
MINN. CONST. art XIII, § 1.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36, 42 (1973).
MINN. CONST. art XIII, § 1.
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 12.

Id.
Id. at 12–13. The Speech or Debate Clause states: “The members of each house in all

cases . . . shall be privileged from arrest during the session of their respective houses and in
going to or returning from the same. For any speech or debate in either house they shall not
be questioned in any other place.” MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 13.
For the statutory argument, the State relied on the Uniform Declaratory Judgements Act.
Id. at 13. The Uniform Declaratory Judgements Act states, “When declaratory relief is
sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties
to the proceeding.” MINN. STAT. § 555.11 (2019). The procedural rule was Rule 19 of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 14. Rule 19.01 states:
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the
action if (a) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties, or (b) the person claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s
absence may (1) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to
protect that interest or (2) leave any one already a party subject to a substantial
204
205
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additional parties were not necessary to grant the requested relief. 206 While
the state argued that some parties who were directly implicated by the action
were not a part of the suit, the court found that the parties were in fact not
necessary. 207 Since the appellants were only requesting relief from the state,
and not the school districts and charter schools, the school districts and
charter schools were not necessary parties. 208 The court stated that even if
the school districts and charter schools could eventually be impacted by the
results of litigation, the eventual impact was not enough to make them
required parties. 209 Following the court’s decision, the case has been
remanded to proceed in the Hennepin County District Court where it was
first filed. 210

2. The Dissent’s Argument Against Justiciability
Justice Anderson’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Gildea, can be
summed up as stating that any “adequacy” of education is “textually
committed to the Minnesota Legislature” and is, therefore, a political
question. 211 “Adequate education” does not appear in the Minnesota
Constitution, and Skeen is the only decision that imposes this level of
requirement on the legislature. 212
Justice Anderson clarified that “for the judiciary to find inadequacy,
it must first define what is adequate” and that any determination of “how or
what educational measure should be adopted ‘is one of the legislative and
not judicial cognizance.’” 213 He maintained that it is not the court’s role to
risk or incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of the person's claimed interest.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 19.01.
Rule 19.02 requires that if a necessary person “cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as
indispensable.” MINN. R. CIV. P. 19.02.
The state argued that the school district and charter schools were necessary parties since
the requested remedy would have directly affected them by potentially changing education
policies, district boundaries, and attendance zones. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 13. The
court agreed with the district court’s assessment that “many non-parties are bound to be
affected by a judicial ruling in an action regarding the constitutionality of state statutes or state
action, but they cannot all be required to be a part of the suit.” Id. at 14.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
206

207
208
209

Id.

Dana Goldstein, How Do You Get Better Schools? Take the States to Court, More
Advocates Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/

210

us/school-segregation-funding-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/26QU-FGQX].
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 15 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 16, 19.
Id. at 17, 19 (quoting Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 5 (1878)).

211
212
213
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define adequacy in education or create educational measures. 214 According
to the dissent, the lower courts must make the determination of adequacy
when the litigation continues through the lower court system. 215
The dissent explained that the constitution tasks the legislature with
the duty of establishing and providing a system of education for Minnesotan
citizens. 216 Additionally, the dissent tried to set aside the precedent from
Skeen, arguing that the right to an adequate education is not a requirement
imposed on the Legislature by the Minnesota Constitution. 217 The dissent
would have the judiciary delegate its own constitutionally mandated duty to
the Legislature to avoid stepping on the toes of the Legislature, even if the
Legislature’s actions impinge on the rights of the people. 218
Despite the dissent’s view, Minnesota, through Cruz-Guzman, is an
example of a state that exercises its constitutionally granted judicial power
and upholds the rights guaranteed to its citizens without straying into the job
of the legislature.
IV. ANALYSIS

A. Courts That Have Found Education Claims to Be Justiciable
While education claims, especially those regarding segregation,
should be considered justiciable, some courts go beyond what is
appropriate. West Virginia, Washington, and New Jersey are examples of
courts that are dangerously close to impeding the legislature’s role by
defining what their education system should be.

1. West Virginia
West Virginia’s constitution states that the “[l]egislature shall
provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free
schools.” 219 West Virginia’s education provision has been regarded as being
a “quality provision,” mandating a specific standard of education. 220 The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that “education is a
fundamental constitutional right” based on the mandatory requirement
stated in the constitution. 221 Although “great weight [is] given to legislatively
established standards” due to the legislature’s “plenary, if not absolute,”
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 16.
See id. at 21–22.

W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
Thro, supra note 87, at 726 n.52.
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
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power over the school system, the judiciary defines what constitutes a
thorough and efficient system of schools. 222 A thorough and efficient system
is one that “develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the
minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful
and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so
economically.” 223
The dissent argued that although the political question doctrine, at
first glance, may seem to be “cowardice on the part of the judiciary,” the
doctrine is a sign of maturity. 224 The dissent stated that courts can only act in
a case such as this when “it is possible to remedy the situation by an order
operating upon a discrete aspect of the problem.” 225 The dissent maintained
that after an additional investigation, a better understanding of the problem
would allow it to be “placed in proper perspective.” 226

2. Washington
Washington’s constitution states, “It is the paramount duty of the
state to make ample provision for the education of all children” within the
state. 227 Washington’s education provision is considered a “high duty
provision” since it treats education as a “paramount duty.” 228 The duty is
placed on the legislative body with the guidance that “the legislature shall
provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.” 229 In
interpreting this constitutional duty, the Washington Supreme Court
considered the duty to provide a quality education as paramount. 230 It stated
that the duty “goes beyond mere reading, writing, and arithmetic. It also
embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary
setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential
competitors in today’s market as well as in the marketplace of ideas.” 231 The
court stated that it was fulfilling its duty to interpret “education” by providing
“broad constitutional guidelines” while leaving the specifics to the
legislature. 232 The dissent complained that the majority “boldly usurp[ed] the
legislative function, taking upon itself the right to decide what minimum
222
223
224
225
226

Id.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 897 (Neely, J., dissenting).
Id. at 900.
Id.

WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
Thro, supra note 87, at 726 n.54. States with “high duty provisions” prioritize education
over other governmental functions. Id. at 726.
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978).
227
228

229
230
231
232

Id.
Id. at 95.
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education shall be provided.” 233 According to the dissent, “the court . . .
substituted its will for that of the people.” 234

3. New Jersey
New Jersey’s constitution states that the “[l]egislature shall provide
for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free
public schools for the instruction of all the children in the [s]tate between
the ages of five and eighteen years.” 235 New Jersey’s constitutional provision
is considered a “quality provision,” which requires a certain quality of
education. 236 Following allegations of inadequate education, the New Jersey
Supreme Court required whole-school reform to be implemented. 237 The
court went on to list what the reform would look like to meet the thorough
and efficient demand of the constitution. 238

B. COURTS THAT REFUSE TO HEAR EDUCATION CLAUSE CLAIMS
While some courts go beyond what is needed to meet their judicial
duty, other courts decide not to hear cases challenging the adequacy of
education. Illinois and Pennsylvania are examples of state courts that choose
not to hear education cases based on justiciability concerns.

233
234
235
236
237
238

Id. at 119 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
Id. at 120.

N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, ¶ 1.
Thro, supra note 87, at 726 n.52.
Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 473 (N.J. 1998).
Id. at 473–74. The commissioner must do the following:
[I]mplement whole-school reform; implement full-day kindergarten and a
half-day pre-school program for three- and four-year olds as expeditiously as
possible; implement the technology, alternative school, accountability, and
school-to-work and college-transition programs; prescribe procedures and
standards to enable individual schools to adopt additional or extended
supplemental programs and to seek and obtain the funds necessary to
implement those programs for which they demonstrated a particularized need;
implement the facilities plan and timetable he proposed; secure funds to cover
the complete cost of remediating identified life-cycle and infrastructure
deficiencies in Abbott school buildings as well as the cost of providing the space
necessary to house Abbott students adequately; and promptly initiate effective
managerial responsibility over school construction, including necessary funding
measures and fiscal reforms, such as may be achieved through amendment of
the Educational Facilities Act.

Id.
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1. Illinois
Illinois’s constitution considers the “educational development of all
persons to the limits of their capacities” to be a “fundamental goal.” 239
Illinois’s constitutional provision is a “high duty provision” and places
education above other duties. 240 It states that Illinois “shall provide for an
efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and
services.” 241 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the “question of
whether the educational institutions and services in Illinois are ‘high quality’
is outside the sphere of the judicial function.” 242
The Illinois Supreme Court finds that making “the question of
educational quality . . . subject to judicial determination would largely
deprive the members of the general public of a voice in a matter which is
close to the hearts of all individuals.” 243 The judicial system, according to the
court, does not easily allow the views of “students, parents, employers and
other[s]” to be heard. 244 In order to discuss educational quality, “solutions .
. . should emerge from a spirited dialogue between the people of the State
and their elected representatives.” 245

2. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Constitution states that “the General Assembly
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.” 246
Pennsylvania’s constitutional mandate is considered to be a “quality
provision.” 247 In a school funding case, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania stated that it is “unable to judicially define what constitutes an
‘adequate’ education or what funds are ‘adequate’ to support such a
program.” 248 The court stated that these “matters which are exclusively
within the purview” of the legislature are “not subject to intervention by the
judicial branch.” 249 The court reasoned that the case was a “textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department” and cited a “lack of judicially manageable
239
240
241
242
243
244
245

ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
Thro, supra note 87, at 726 n.54.
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d. 1178, 1193 (Ill. 1996).
Id. at 1191.

Id.
Id.

PENN. CONST. art. III, § 14.
Thro, supra note 87, at 726 n.52.
Marrero ex rel. Tabales v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 965 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998),
aff’d sub nom. Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999).
Id. at 965–66.
246
247
248

249
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standards.” 250 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lack of
justiciability of education-adequacy claims as matters “not subject to
intervention by the judicial branch.” 251

3. Florida
The Florida Constitution states that “[t]he education of children is
a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a
paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education
of all children residing in its borders.” 252 Florida’s constitutional mandate is
considered the highest level put on the government—a “high duty
provision.” 253
Yet, when the Florida Supreme Court faced the issue of the state’s
failure to provide an adequate education in Coalition for Adequacy &
Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 254 the court took a curious stance.
The court acknowledged the importance of the duty on the government, yet
decided that the claims were not worth an intrusion onto the legislative
body. 255 Even though the constitution placed a “paramount duty” on the
government to provide an adequate education, 256 the court found that the
education clause only requires “a system . . . that gives every student an equal
chance to achieve basic educational goals.” 257 The court stated that the
plaintiffs had failed to “demonstrate . . . an appropriate standard for
determining ‘adequacy’ that would not present a substantial risk of judicial
intrusion into the powers and responsibilities assigned to the legislature.” 258
Due to the legislature’s discretion in education matters and the plaintiffs’
failure to demonstrate a violation of the legislature’s educational duties, the
Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the case.

250
251

Id. at 966.
Marrero, 739 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1999).

FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
Thro, supra note 87, at 726 n.54.
680 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996). The plaintiffs alleged that (1) certain students were not receiving
sufficient support to help them gain proficiency in English; (2) certain students were not
receiving the adequate attention for their greater needs; (3) students were not receiving
adequate special programs; and (4) students in poor counties were not receiving an adequate
education. Id. at 402. Additionally, it was alleged that the legislation was imposing burdens
that prevented schools from being able to “perform their constitutional duties.” Id.
252
253
254

255

Id.

FLA CONST. art. IX, § 1.
Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 406 (quoting St. Johns Cty. v. Ne. Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d
635, 641 (Fla. 1991)).
Id. at 408.
256
257

258
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C. Minnesota as the Middle Ground
The Minnesota Supreme Court is an example of a court that
carefully balances its constitutional duty with the principle of separation of
powers. Some state supreme courts, such as those in West Virginia,
Washington, and New Jersey, go beyond evaluating the legislature by
crafting the reform from the judiciary’s perspective. 259 While the Minnesota
Supreme Court, in Cruz-Guzman, discharged its duty to assess whether
counterpart branches of government were fulfilling their duties, the court,
unlike the supreme courts of West Virginia, Washington, and New Jersey,
did not step into the province of the legislature. 260 Although the CruzGuzman dissent insisted that the court would need to establish an
educational standard for the legislature if the case continued, 261 the majority
noted that “specific determinations of educational policy are matters for the
Legislature.” 262 The court merely considered whether the legislature’s
current educational policy was meeting or violating the standard. The court
relied on the precedent set by previous cases that held this sort of questions
to be justiciable. 263
Justice Anderson concluded that the task in Cruz-Guzman has been
“historically and textually the province of the Legislature” because the
political question doctrine is meant to “keep the three beaches of [the]
government in their respective lanes.” 264 Yet, not allowing the court to hear
claims challenging the legislature’s actions would constitute inappropriate
deference to the legislature. By choosing to hear such claims in CruzGuzman, the Minnesota Supreme Court irrefutably declared to its
governmental counterparts, other states, and the citizens of Minnesota that
fundamental rights are going to be protected. 265
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have taken the route of the
appellate court and decided that claims concerning the fundamental right of
education, equal protection, and due process are nonjusticiable, but it did
not. 266 Instead, it protected three fundamental rights and allowed violations
of those rights to be challenged in court. 267 The court acknowledged that

259

See supra Section IV.B.

Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 9–10 (Minn. 2018).
Id. at 17 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“Logic demands that, for the judiciary to find
inadequacy, it must first define what is adequate.”).
Id. at 9 (majority opinion).
Id. at 11–12 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Sauk Ctr. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412 (1871); Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993)).
260
261

262
263

264
265
266
267

Id.
See id. at 12.
See id.
See id.
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education is a complex and varied field, 268 but it is also “perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.” 269 Thus, the complexity
of education law should not prevent courts from discussing and deciding
cases involving it.
By deciding that cases involving educational decisions by the
legislature are justiciable, Minnesota joins the company of other states that
maintain the same. Unlike West Virginia, Washington, and New Jersey, 270
Minnesota does not go too far by providing a laundry list of legislative
actions that satisfy the constitutional mandate of the education clause.
Unlike Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Florida, 271 Minnesota also does not shy
away from its responsibility to hear alleged constitutional violations of
education and equal protection rights.

D. Benefits and Drawbacks of Courts Not Hearing Education Clause
Cases
There are various arguments against the judiciary hearing general
or segregation-related education cases. A strong argument is that hearing
such cases violates separation of powers. This argument questions the
legitimacy of courts involving themselves in education clause cases. Many
state constitutions note that education is an area for the legislature. 272
Determinations regarding education impact the whole state and everyone in
it. Accordingly, some argue that since the legislature represents the people,
the legislature is the best body to decide these matters. 273 Critics of the
judiciary entering this field similarly argue that because the court is often not
involved in political practice, it is not representative of the peoples’ desires. 274
268
269
270
271
272

Id.

Bd. of Educ. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412, 415 (1871).

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See, e.g., ALA. CONST., art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST., art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST., art.

XI, § 1; CAL. CONST., art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST., art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST., art. VIII, §
1; DEL. CONST., art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST., art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST., art. VIII, § 1; KAN.
CONST., art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST., § 183; LA. CONST., art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST., art. VIII,
part 1, § 1; MD. CONST., art. VIII § 1; MICH. CONST, art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST., art. XIII,
§ 1; MISS. CONSt., art. VIII, § 201; MO. CONST., art. IX § 1, cl. a; MONT. CONST., art. X, §
1; NEB. CONST., art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST., art. XI, § 2; N.J. CONST., art. VIII, § 4, para.
(1); N.M. CONST., art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST., art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST., art. IX, § 2; N.D.
CONST., art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST., art. VI § 3; OKLA. CONST., art. XIII, § 1; ORE.
CONST., art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST., art. III, § 14; S.C. CONSt., art. XI, § 3, S.D. CONST., art.
VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST., art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST., art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST., art. X, §
1; VA. CONST., art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST., art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CONST., art. XII, § 1;
WIS. CONST., art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST., art. VII, § 1.
Cover, supra note 56, at 412.
273
274

Id.
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However, some scholars argue that this is a “fundamentally flawed
view of the concept of judicial review.” 275 The U.S. Constitution does not
mention whether the legislative branch or the executive branch should
decide when a constitutional violation has occurred. 276 Additionally,
deferring to the legislature or the executive when a specific power is vested
in that particular branch would extend discretion to “virtually every
provision vesting authority in a political branch.” 277
A second argument against adjudicating education cases is that the
judiciary lacks the competency to hear such cases. As Justice Anderson’s
dissent noted in Cruz-Guzman, to reach a finding that an education system
does not meet the constitutionally mandated standard, that standard must
first be defined. 278 Some argue that the standards defined by courts are vague
and do not explain what the education system must do because courts are
not necessarily well-versed in education policy. 279 Because education is a
complex area, vague standards issued by courts can be especially difficult to
implement.
These vague standards can also make future cases more difficult to
adjudicate. 280 Courts will need to decide whether judicially created plans
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031,
1033 (1984); see also, Stancil & Hilbert, supra note 62, at 441.
Stancil & Hilbert, supra note 62, at 441 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 150 (6th ed. 2012)).
Id. (quoting Redish, supra note 275, at 1040).
Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 17 (Minn. 2018) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Note, The Misguided Appeal of a Minimally Adequate Education, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1458, 1469–70 (2017). The author notes the court’s decision in Rose, where the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated:
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and
every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and
written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and
rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient
understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand
the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient selfknowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v)
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of
academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete
favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the
job market.
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
According to the author, these are vague standards that do not explain how to meet the stated
functions and leave the legislature with no guidance.
Cover, supra note 56, at 412–13.
275

276

277
278
279

280
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meet the constitutionally mandated standard and might have difficulties
evaluating the plans that are approved if there are no straight-forward
benchmarks. 281 Justice Anderson, in the Cruz-Guzman dissent, noted: [T]he
adequacy of education – and thus the sufficiency of the Legislature’s
compliance with its constitutional duty – must be constantly reevaluated as
proposals, budgets, enrollments, learning objective, initiative, and education
resources change and evolve. 282
Nebraska’s Supreme Court stated that, in education cases, “[t]he
landscape is littered with courts that have been bogged down in the legal
quicksand of continuous litigation and challenges to their states’ school
funding systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse to wade into that Stygian
swamp.” 283 Courts, however, have had success and have been called to enter
the arena of education reform before in many other contexts. 284 Nebraska
failed to mention states like Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Vermont, where
the judiciary has quickly and effectively implemented major reforms. 285
Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court has argued that judicially created
standards are not too vague and are judicially manageable. 286 In 2005, the
Texas Supreme court stated that although some constitutional standards can
have a variety of considerations, “they are not without content.” 287 The court
explained that between the two extremes is a middle ground of what an
adequate education can be. 288 In that middle ground, there is much “on
281

Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 22 (Anderson, J., dissenting); see also Cover, supra note

56, at 413.

Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 22 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007).
The court noted that Arkansas, Kansas, Alabama, Texas, and New Jersey have had
difficulties with education litigation. Id. at 182–83. At the same time, four of these five states
have had substantial progress in education reform. REBELL, supra note 135, at 31–32, 40–
41.
See Stancil & Hilbert, supra note 62, at 444–45 (describing how the judiciary has dealt with
vague standards such as “cruel and unusual” punishment, “reasonableness,” and “probable
cause”).
See REBELL, supra note 135, at 28. In Kentucky, there was an upheaval of the education
system, a reduction in districts’ spending disparities, and an increase in testing scores. Id. In
Massachusetts, the enactment of an education reform act reduced funding disparities
between districts and also increased student proficiency. Id. In Vermont, there were
improvements in student outcomes just months after litigation. Id.
Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 (Tex. 2005).
282
283

284

285

286
287
288

Id.
Id., stating:

At one extreme, no one would dispute that a public education system limited to
teaching first-grade reading would be inadequate, or that a system without
resources to accomplish its purposes would be inefficient and unsuitable. At the
other, few would insist that merely to be adequate, public education must teach
all students multiple languages or nuclear biophysics, or that to be efficient,
available resources must be unlimited.
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which reasonable minds should come together, and much over which they
may differ. The judiciary is well-accustomed to applying substantive
standards, the crux of which is reasonableness.” 289
Finally, opponents of judicial involvement in education cases argue
that education, as a whole, is a very complicated field with various possible
meanings of good education. 290 Even the Supreme Court of the United
States has noted that “[e]ducation, perhaps even more than welfare
assistance, presents a myriad of ‘intractable economic, social, and even
philosophical problems.’” 291 The Court further explained that “the very
complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public
school system suggests that ‘there will be more than one constitutionally
permissible method of solving them,’ and that, within the limits of
rationality, ‘the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems’ should be entitled
to respect.” 292
Although some scholars believe that there are enough justifications
for a court to stay out of the field of education, there are many more reasons
for the judiciary to fulfill its duty of determining the constitutionality of
legislative action.

E. Why Courts Should Enter the Field of Education Segregation Issues
After Rodriguez, plaintiffs in education segregation cases were left
with no options for seeking relief from the federal court system. 293 As a
result, plaintiffs were forced to turn to their state courts and state
constitutions. However, the battle was not easily won by plaintiffs who
turned to state courts. In the wake of Rodriguez, many state courts followed
a trend of non-intervention. 294
With the doors of both federal and state courts were closed because
of non-intervention strategies, how else could plaintiffs seek relief? Stated
another way, “[i]f [the right to education] exists—and it does—how can the
court be precluded from determining the nature of that right and deciding

289

Id.

In Cruz-Guzman, both the majority and the dissent alluded that “education is a complex
area.” Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d 1, 12, 20–21 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (Minn. 2018).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (citing Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
Id. (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546–47 (1972)).
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
Johnson, supra note 57, at 335–36. Arizona and Michigan were two of the states that
favored non-intervention. Arizona upheld the constitutionality of that state’s educational
finance system. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973). Michigan vacated a
former order that had declared the school financing system unconstitutional. See Milliken v.
Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972).
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whether that right has been violated?” 295 Because of Rodriguez, state courts
are “not simply the first line of defense for the right, but the only line.” 296
State courts should exercise their constitutional duty to hear and decide
cases where violations of constitutional rights are at stake.

1. Political Question Doctrine’s Applicability to Education Clauses
Although most courts have addressed the issue of school funding
and not segregation, the principle of judicial responsibility applies
interchangeably. As the Arkansas Supreme Court stated, “[Refusing] to
review school funding under our state constitution would be a complete
abrogation of our judicial responsibility and would work a severe disservice
to the people of this state.” 297 The court emphatically declared that it
“refuse[d] to close [its] eyes or turn a deaf ear to the claims of a dereliction
of duty in the field of education.” 298 Arkansas and a majority of states have
found claims regarding their respective education clauses to be justiciable. 299
The political question doctrine is not without critique. According
to one critic, the political question doctrine “inherently implies that one or
both of the political branches may continue conduct that could conceivably
be found unconstitutional, without any examination or supervision by the
judicial branch.” 300 The legislative branch, although vital, is not without fault.
Members are often concerned with re-election and face a wide variety of
other issues. As such, legislators do not always prioritize addressing
segregation in education, and it persists as a result.
The judiciary has a special role in our government as neutral decisionmakers. It should not shy away from its role simply because the legislature
is charged with establishing an education system. 301 If the judiciary does not
examine the actions of the legislature, no other branch will. 302 Although it
can be argued that the political question doctrine should prevent courts
from deciding cases on the education system, this does not serve a states’
citizens. It is the citizens of each state who are harmed if the education
system is inadequate and segregated, and these citizens deserve to have their
claims heard.

Brief of American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 3, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018) (No. A16-1265).
Id. at 4.
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 484 (Ark. 2002).
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Id.

Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1219 (Kan. 2014) (“[A] clear majority of [state courts]
have ruled in favor of justiciability . . . .”).
Redish, supra note 275, at 1060.
See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2018).
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2. The State Court and Its Role
Article III of the U.S. Constitution does not limit state courts.
Unlike the federal court system, which requires a “case” or a
“controversy,” 303 state courts can have greater flexibility. 304 Similarly, state
courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, can find claims justiciable and grant
jurisdiction where federal courts would be limited. In fact, state courts can
make this decision “entirely prudential.” 305 Unlike federal courts, the state
court system is able to “offer binding advisory opinions in education finance
cases, thereby deferring to the legislature as to remedy, but still upholding
state constitutional individual rights.” 306 Additionally, the highest courts in
many states have held that there is an enforceable right to education, 307 with
some states finding the right to education to be fundamental. 308 Unlike the
federal Constitution, which does not include a fundamental right to
education, the education right in state constitutions allow and call for state
courts to hear education segregation claims. 309
Although some situations or claims are challenging for courts to
resolve and might tempt courts to dismiss education-segregation claims on
justiciability grounds, many claims deserve a second look. Courts should
hear and decide claims related to education segregation because this issue
impacts all students, and students deserve an equal opportunity to receive

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that state courts are not constrained by the
federal “case or controversy requirement” in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. See N.Y.
State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988) (“[T]he special
limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on the jurisdiction of the federal courts
are not binding on the state courts. The States are thus left free as a matter of their own
procedural law to determine whether their courts may issue advisory opinions or to
determine matters that would not satisfy the more stringent requirement in the federal courts
that an actual “case” or “controversy” be presented for resolution.”) (citation omitted).
Cover, supra note 56, at 419.
Id. n.107 (citing George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts
Perspective on the State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 563–67 (1994)).
See Roni R. Reed, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended and
Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 582, 591–602 (1996).
Id. at 596–600.
See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) (“[T]he right to education is
so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.”);
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (“[A] child’s right to
an adequate education is a fundamental one under out Constitution.”); Bismarck Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994) (finding education to be a
fundamental right under the state’s constitution but refusing to apply strict scrutiny); District
of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995) (“[P]ublic education
in Pennsylvania is a fundamental right.”); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va.
1994) (finding a fundamental right to education); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579–
80 (Wis. 1989) (“[E]ducation is, to a certain degree, a fundamental right.”).
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high quality education. 310 Courts should not “shirk their duty to uphold
constitutional rights—especially when the rights of minority groups are at
stake.” 311 Segregation is a type of constitutional violation that should be more
justiciable than other claims, and courts should have jurisdiction to hear
segregation claims. 312 Plaintiffs bringing segregation claims have a “robust
body of preexisting law” to turn to when facing justiciability issues. 313 Brown
v. Board of Education clearly states that “the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” 314 As
Professor Chemerinsky eloquently—and correctly—put it, “without judicial
action[,] equal educational opportunity will never exist.” 315
Additionally, state constitutions grant their citizens affirmative,
positive rights that require action on the part of the government. The state
government—specifically the legislature and the governor—has “a duty to
achieve, or at least to help promote, the constitutional mandate.” 316 Given
that many state constitutions include education provisions, state courts have
the role of the “final guardian and protector of the right to education.” 317

3. The Right to a Remedy
Justiciability is rooted in the idea that “where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is
invaded.” 318 The Supreme Court has stated that “injury to a legally protected
right” is “the touchstone to justiciability.” 319 This principle has particular
force “when the right is enshrined in a constitution.” 320 The Court has
recognized:
That courts not only have the power to decide whether a
constitutionally prescribed right has been violated but that it is
“the very essence of judicial duty” to do so. . . . Consistent with
these foundational principles of [the] democracy, state appellate
courts have held repeatedly that when a constitution guarantees

310
311

See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2018).
The Misguided Appeal of a Minimally Adequate Education, supra note 279, at 1472 (citing

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
Stancil & Hilbert, supra note 62, at 440.

312
313

Id.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
Stancil & Hilbert, supra note 62, at 400 n.1 (quoting Chemerinsky, The
Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 111 (2004)).
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1999).
Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 261 (Mont. 2005).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140–41 (1950).
Educ. Law Ctr. Brief, supra note 177, at 6.
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its citizens a particular right, the judiciary may—and, indeed,
must—adjudicate a legal challenge seeking to vindicate it. 321
This right to a remedy is not unique to the United States judicial
system. A Chief Justice of the King’s Bench stated that “[i]f the plaintiff has
a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it and
a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it.” 322 As far back
as 1703, English courts recognized that “[w]here a man has but one remedy
to come at his right, if he loses that he loses his right.” 323 This connection
between the judiciary’s constitutional duty and the people’s corresponding
right is also present in education cases. 324
Minnesota’s own constitution states that “[e]very person is entitled
to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may
receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without
delay, comfortable to the laws.” 325 When courts hold that education claims
are nonjusticiable, they leave plaintiffs without a remedy and effectively
assert that education is not a right worth defending—a right without a
remedy. 326 The same goes for due process and equal protection. Without a
remedy, a student’s right to equal protection of the law is left without a
definition. 327 The remedies are what define the right. In education, the
remedies would be “prohibiting the racial assignment of students, requiring
integrated schools, and redressing realities causally related to segregation.” 328
The judiciary has “the final ‘obligation to guard, enforce and protect
education requirements mandated by the Constitution.’” 329 If the judiciary
321
322
323

Id. at 6–7 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178).
Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (1703).

Id.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stated that “the existence of
a Constitutional duty presupposes a correlative constitutional right in the person for whom
the duty is to be exercised.” Brewer v. Hoxie Sch. Dist. No. 46 of Lawrence Cty., Ark., 238
F.2d 91, 100 (8th Cir. 1956). Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court has explained
that “[b]y imposing upon the State a paramount duty to make ample provision for the
education of all children residing within the State’s borders, the constitution has created a
‘duty’ that is supreme, preeminent or dominant.” Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978). The court further conveyed that “[f]lowing from this
constitutionally imposed ‘duty’ is its jural correlative, a correspondent ‘right’ permitting
control of another’s conduct. Therefore, all children residing within . . . the State possess a
‘right,’ arising from the constitutionally imposed ‘duty’ of the State, to have the State make
ample provision for their education.” Id.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under
Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1640 (2004).
Id. at 1638.
Id. at 1639.
Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 261 (Mont. 2005) (quoting
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
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denies plaintiffs the right to a remedy, the underlying rights which beget the
remedy become unenforceable and “are ghosts that are seen in the law but
are elusive to the grasp.” 330 When courts state that education-related claims
cannot be heard, the right to an education is “effectively nullified.” 331
The rights to education, due process, and equal protection cannot
and should not be nullified because a court is unwilling to intrude on the
political branches of the government. Plaintiffs seeking a remedy turn to the
court system because the judicial system “is premised on the
universally-accepted principle that court judgements have meaning,” and
any resulting remedies “will be backed up by all necessary enforcement
actions that may be required to ensure compliance.” 332 Plaintiffs seeking the
protection of the courts deserve more, especially when they are standing up
against systematic segregation allegedly caused by the legislature. 333 Plaintiffs
have no other place to turn to when the legislature fails to fulfill its duty and
the judiciary claims its hands are tied. The United States has a history of
racism, and students deserve an education free from the grips of racism in
schools. 334 If the legislature is not up to the job, the court should and will
step in.
V. CONCLUSION
The Cruz-Guzman decision allows plaintiffs to have their day in
court and reaffirms the judiciary’s constitutionally mandated duty of saying
what the law is. Given this decision, Minnesota has joined the majority of
state courts in stating that education is a fundamental right and anything that
impedes that right may be challenged in its courts.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding—that claims arising from
alleged violations of the Education Clause are justiciable—is critical to
ensuring that the rights granted in the Minnesota Constitution are given
meaning. Rather than allowing separation-of-power concerns to dictate the
judiciary’s role, the court has actualized its intended role as the adjudicator
of constitutional violations.
330
331
332

Ex parte United States, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
Thomas, supra note 326, at 1640.
Id. at 1641.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018); see also Katie Nodjimbadem, The Racial Segregation of American
Cities Was Anything But Accidental, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 30, 2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-federal-government-intentionally-raciallysegregated-american-cities-180963494/ [https://perma.cc/VJ2H-VFWE] (“[S]egregation in
every metropolitan area was imposed by racially explicit federal, state and local policy,
without which private actions of prejudice or discrimination would not have been very
effective.”).
See generally Rick Wormeli, Let’s Talk about Racism in Schools, 74 DISRUPTING
INEQUITY 16 (2016) (discussing how vitriol and violence connected to race are running high
and arguing that classrooms are the place to start the construction of a nonracist society).
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